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On January 7, 2019, Judge Beth Bloom granted MSC Cruises SA CO’s 
(“MSC”) motion to dismiss the case of Havana Docks Corporation v. MSC 
Cruises SA Co (the “MSC case”). This case was one of the first filed under 
the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (“LIBERTAD”) Act, and its dismissal is 
surprising because the legal conclusion reverses course on a point of law 
previously decided by Judge Bloom in the case of Havana Docks 
Corporation v. Carnival Cruise Lines (the “Carnival case”).
Title III of the LIBERTAD Act creates a private cause of action against a 
party that “‘traffics’ in” property nationalized by the Castro regime.[1] 
(applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-
10264BE205C7#_edn1) However, until May 2, 2019, the right to bring 
an action under Title III was repeatedly suspended in six-month intervals by 
“successive Presidents and Secretaries of State.”[2] 
(applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-
10264BE205C7#_edn2) With the suspension lifted, Havana Docks 
Corporation (“HDC”), a Delaware corporation, filed multiple actions with 
the same allegation: when US travel restrictions to Cuba were eased, multiple cruise lines trafficked in HDC’s property by disembarking passengers at port 
facilities in Havana.[3] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-10264BE205C7#_edn3) HDC based its suits on a certified claim issued to 
Havana Docks Corporation by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in 1971.[4] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-
10264BE205C7#_edn4) At the time the claim was authorized, the nationalized property included a concession for HDC to operate three piers at the 
entrance of the harbor of Havana, and the concession was valued at approximately $9 Million.[5] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-
10264BE205C7#_edn5)
Judge Bloom’s reversal from the Carnival Case to the MSC Case was based on the rights conferred to HDC by the Cuban government in the terms of the 
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HDC had no interest in the subject property because the concession certified by HDC was to expire in 2004 and the alleged trafficking did not commence 
until 2016.[7] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-10264BE205C7#_edn7) This argument was rejected because “the plain language of the 
Libertad Act states that ‘any person… that traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government… shall be liable to any United States 
national who owns the claim to such property.’”[8] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-10264BE205C7#_edn8) Because of the plain 
language, “the Defendant incorrectly conflate[d] a claim to a property and a property interest.”[9] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-
10264BE205C7#_edn9) However, in MSC, Judge Bloom shifted the emphasis of her interpretation of the statute from “who owns the claim to such 
property” to “who owns the claim to such property.”[10] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-10264BE205C7#_edn10) By doing so, she 
concluded that the property owned by HDC was a “time-limited” leasehold interest, and it would only have been possible for the defendant to traffic in such 
property during the period of the leasehold.[11] (applewebdata://D0146C4C-3894-408C-B27A-10264BE205C7#_edn11)
The reinterpretation of the rights of a certified claimant in the MSC case demonstrates the complex issues created by the intersection of property, federal 
statutory, and international laws that Libertad Act claims are likely to present. In conjunction with these legal questions, however, should be fundamental 
questions of fairness, such as whether the Libertad Act, clearly intended to deter profiting from the nationalization of property without compensation, should 
provide no recourse when an unlawful taking still has not been corrected after 60 years. 
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